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Abstract 
This paper embodies the authors’ suggestive, hypothetical 
and sometimes speculative attempts to answer questions 
related to the interplay between consciousness and AI. We 
explore the theoretical foundations of consciousness in AI 
systems. We provide examples that demonstrate the 
potential utility of incorporating functional consciousness 
in cognitive AI systems. We also explore the possible 
contributions to the scientific study of consciousness from 
insights obtained by building and experimenting with 
conscious AI systems. Finally, we evaluate the possibility 
of phenomenally conscious machines. 
Introduction 
Due to the predominance of the behaviorists in 
psychology, the scientific study of consciousness was 
taboo for much of the twentieth century. Thus there was 
little motivation for AI researchers to include 
consciousness in such cognitive architectures as SOAR 
(Laird et al, 1987), ACT-R (Anderson and Lebiere, 1998) 
or CAPS (Thibadeau et al, 1982). The demise of the 
behaviorists, together with the roughly concurrent rise of 
consciousness studies in cognitive psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience, and the appearance of cognitive 
architectures such as CLARION (Sun, 1997) and IDA 
(Franklin et al, 1998) that included consciousness, resulted 
in the rebirth of the scientific study of consciousness as a 
subject of possible interest to AI researchers. This new 
interest gave rise to questions such as:  
  Are there theoretical foundations for the study of 
consciousness in AI systems. 
  Can cognitive architectures that include consciousness 
be of use to AI? 
  Can such AI cognitive architectures add to our 
knowledge of consciousness in humans and animals? 
  Are phenomenally conscious AI systems even 
possible? 
This paper embodies the authors’ suggestive, hypothetical 
and sometimes speculative attempts to answer these 
questions. 
Conscious AI Systems 
Though consciousness has been the subject of study in 
philosophy for millennia, it’s quite new within AI. What 
would consciousness even mean in an AI context? The 
study of consciousness has been divided into the “hard 
problem” and the “easy problem” (Chalmers, 1996) or, put 
in another way, the issues of phenomenal consciousness 
and of access (Block, 1995), or functional (Franklin,  2003) 
consciousness. Phenomenal, or subjective, consciousness 
refers to the subjective, individual conscious experience 
with which we are each so familiar. Functional 
consciousness refers to consciousness functioning within 
either natural or artificial systems. Global Workspace 
Theory (GWT) (Baars 1988, 1997), the currently dominant 
scientific theory of consciousness, together with its LIDA 
model (Franklin and Patterson, 2006; Ramamurthy et al 
2006) focuses on the function of consciousness in solving 
the relevance problem, that is, in providing the system with 
access to its internal resources that are most relevant to the 
current situation. Hence the alternative name, access 
consciousness. 
There are other theoretical views that draw different 
distinctions between conscious and unconscious processes 
as illustrated by Sun & Franklin (2007). The threshold 
view maintains that the main difference between 
unconscious and conscious mental representations is that 
the activation values associated with the former are below 
a certain threshold (Bowers et al., 1990). A distinct view 
popularized by the cognitive model ACT-R (Servan-
Schreiber & Anderson, 1987) is based on the notion of a 
chunk – a unitary representation of either a production rule 
(Rosenbloom et al., 1993) or a sequence of sensory-
perceptual elements (Servan-Schreiber & Anderson, 1987). 
A conscious process would always use several simple 
chunks while an unconscious process would use a single 
complex chunk. The dynamical systems view advocated by 
Mathis and Mozer (1996) claims that the trajectory of 
conscious processes lands in a stable attractor while 
unconscious processes are in a transient state. 
Saving the question of phenomenally conscious 
machines for later, we will, for now concentrate on 
functional consciousness in AI systems. Sun and Franklin 
have provided a review of AI systems which could 
conceivably be thought of as embodying functional 
consciousness (2007), though a number of them don’t say 
so. Another such review will soon appear (Gamez, 2007).  
In summary, by a conscious AI system, we will mean an 
artificial autonomous agent (Franklin and Graesser. 1997) 
that incorporates some sort of functional consciousness 
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process that allows only the most relevant incoming input 
through. Every autonomous agent with sufficiently rich 
sensing in a complex environment will need to filter its 
input data, often in several different ways. Functional 
consciousness is one such way as we will see in the next 
section. 
Utility of Conscious Cognitive Agents to AI 
As described above functional (or access) consciousness is 
viewed as the processing of things in experience (Block, 
2004) without assuming any subjective experience. Baars 
(1988, p. 349) highlights several activities that require 
functional consciousness like prioritization of alternatives, 
problem solving, decision making, etc. Each of these 
functional aspects of consciousness can be leveraged to 
solve critical problems in AI and robotics. For example, 
Gamez (2007) claims that research devoted to the 
development of machines with the cognitive characteristics 
associated with consciousness will ultimately lead to AI 
systems that are capable of integrating emotions with 
percepts, attending to various aspects of their 
environments, and constructing mental representations of 
virtual scenarios.  
In the subsequent discussion we focus on the role of 
consciousness in solving two problems that are ubiquitous 
to any artificial agent immersed in a complex, dynamic 
environment. These include the role of consciousness as a 
perceptual filter and an important component for human 
like developmental learning. 
Consciousness as a Perceptual Filter 
Be it human, animal, software agent or robot, every 
autonomous agent within a complex, dynamical 
environment must frequently and cyclically sample (sense) 
its environment and act on it in order to advance its goals. 
Due to the inherent diversity and richness of the real world 
an agent embedded in that world may well require a 
sequence of finely-tuned filters to sort through the vast 
amounts of incoming sensory information. The filters 
would isolate information relevant. to the agents’ agenda in 
order to guide the selection of actions to meet its goals. 
These filters operate at various levels of granularity and 
information is filtered through in an increasing order of 
abstraction in a bottom-up manner. 
At the lowest level our sensors have been evolutionarily 
programmed to act as passive filters for unperceivable 
signals such as infra red light and ultrasonic sound. One 
can think of this as a passive filtering process that occurs at 
the reception level. Next, at the perceptual level an 
additional phase of content filtration takes place where the 
sensory input is matched to stored representations that have 
been experienced in the past and are personally relevant to 
the agent. Another filtering process also comes into play 
when one attempts to retrieve information from the vast 
stores of long term (episodic) memory.  
The aforementioned filters operate at the preconscious 
level. Consciousness plays an important role as a higher-
level filter by considering the relevance, importance, 
urgency, insistence, etc. of information. Consciousness is 
perhaps the most restrictive filter that agglomerates 
subconscious, disparate information from sensory 
processes and memory into a serial, coherent pattern that 
can be used to recruit resources.  
In addition to serving as a perceptual filter, 
consciousness solves the relevance problem by 
broadcasting content that is central to the agenda of the 
agent to the vast array of unconscious processors in order 
to recruit them into solving the current problem (Baars, 
1988).  
The benefit of consciousness as a perceptual filter and 
by providing a solution to the relevance problem has been 
demonstrated by McCauley in his neural schema 
mechanism (2002). Simply put, his system performed 
better with consciousness than without. 
Consciousness for Human Like Machine Learning 
Dating back to Samuel’s checker player (1959), machine 
learning is among the oldest of the sub-branches of AI with 
many practitioners and many successes to its credit. Still, 
after fifty years of effort, there are persistent difficulties 
that seem to stem from methodological limitations. 
Machine learning often requires large, accurate training 
sets, shows little awareness of what’s known or not known, 
integrates new knowledge poorly into old, learns only one 
task at a time, allows little transfer of learned knowledge to 
new tasks, and is poor at learning from human teachers.  
In contrast, human learning has solved many of these 
problems, and is typically continual, quick, efficient, 
accurate, robust, flexible, and effortless.  As an example 
consider perceptual learning, the learning of new objects, 
categories, relations, etc. Traditional machine learning 
approaches such as object detection, classification, 
clustering, etc, are highly susceptible to the problems 
raised above. However, perceptual learning in humans and 
animals seem to have no such restrictions. Perceptual 
learning in humans occurs incrementally so there is no 
need for a large training set at the front end.  Learning and 
knowledge extraction are achieved simultaneously through 
a dynamical system that can adapt to changes in the nature 
of the stimuli perceived in the environment. Additionally, 
human like learning is based on reinforcement rather than 
fitting to a dataset or model.  Therefore, in addition to 
learning, humans can also forget. Initially, many 
associations are made between entities, the ones that are 
sufficiently reinforced persist, while the ones that aren’t 
decay. 
This raises the question of how then do human learn to 
perceive so robustly and effortlessly? Does consciousness 
help? 
In our view conscious awareness is sufficient for 
learning. Although subliminal acquisition of information 
appears to occur, the effect sizes and duration are quite 
small compared to conscious learning. In a classic study, 
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be learned with 96% recognition accuracy, after only 5 
seconds of conscious exposure to each picture. No 
intention to learn was needed. Consciously learned 
educational material has been recalled after 50 years 
(Bahrick, 1984). No effect sizes nearly as long-lasting as 
these have been reported in the subliminal learning 
literature (Elliott & Dolan, 1998). Conscious access greatly 
facilitates most types of learning. 
Once again consider perceptual learning, i.e. the learning 
of new objects, categories, and relations. In our view 
humans learn that to which we attend, or what we are 
conscious of (Baars, 1988, Chapter 9). This occurs by 
providing the mental (or learned) representation of an 
object or a category with a measure of its usefulness in the 
past. The representation is considered to be useful if it is 
sensed, perceived, and attended to.  Hence, while we are 
profligate in creating new representations, we are saved 
from computationally intractability by the rapid decay of 
almost all of the new representations. Only the 
representations that come to consciousness often and/or at 
high arousal levels have much chance of not quickly 
decaying away. 
 
Figure 1. Reinforcement Curve 
 
One way to model the usefulness of a representation is 
via a saturating, asymmetric sigmoid curve with transition 
height is a, the transition centre b , and transition width 
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as shown in Figure 1. The 
X-axis is the number of times the agent is conscious of the 
stimulus.  
As Figure 1 illustrates, the usefulness of the 
representation (or base level activation) is initially quite 
small and its initial growth rate is quite slow. However, 
once a sufficient amount has been accumulated the growth 
rate is more rapid until it saturates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AI Can Benefit the Scientific Study of 
Consciousness 
Experimental science progresses via a 
theorize predict experiment theorize cycle during 
which a theory is built, predictions made from the theory 
are tested by experimentation, and the theory is revised in 
the light of empirical findings, tested again, etc. 
(Beveridge, 1957, Losee, 1980, Salmon, 1990).  All 
scientific theories are, to some extent, both functional and 
mechanistic in nature. A functional theory describes what 
can be expected to occur in a given situation. A 
mechanistic theory speaks to the how of the occurrence, the 
mechanism that brings it about. 
Most current theories of consciousness are typically 
functional in nature (e.g. Global Workspace Theory, Baars, 
1988; 1997; neural synchronization, Crick, 1994; Edelman 
& Tononi, 2000). These theories are intended to both 
explain the processes underlying consciousness and predict 
their functionality, that is, what can be expected to happen 
under various conditions. Although these functional 
models are quite useful, even essential, they yield little 
insight into the mechanisms underlying the conscious 
processes.  
In contrast, the control system of any autonomous agent 
system, by its very nature, must be fully integrated. That is, 
it must chose its actions based on incoming exogenous or 
endogenous stimuli utilizing all needed internal processes. 
Also, the control system of an agent must act through its 
underlying mechanisms. Therefore, the implementation of 
any autonomous agent requires an underlying mechanistic 
theory to guide its development. 
Almost by definition, the architecture of a functionally 
conscious agent, an artificial system that employs a 
cognitive architecture with consciousness to select its next 
action, is derived from integrated models of the 
consciousness and cognition of humans and/or other 
animals. Its control system is designed using that 
integrated cognitive architecture, and is structurally 
coupled to its underlying mechanisms.  By incorporating 
consciousness in an autonomous agent, the designer 
explicitly provides a mechanistic model by fleshing out a 
functional theory of consciousness. 
An AI model builder may also work through something 
like a theorize predict experiment  theorize cycle. A 
conscious agent is designed and built. It is deployed in an 
environment and predictions on its behavior are made. 
Experimentation shows that it doesn’t perform as desired. 
Its functionally conscious control system and, possibly, the 
underlying mechanisms are redesigned and rebuilt. More 
experimentation takes place resulting in more redesigning, 
etc. 
The two theorize experiment  theorize cycles can be 
amalgamated by means of a conscious agent able to 
participate in or to replicate a psychological experiment 
involving human consciousness. The conceptual 
architecture of the agent would functionally model the 
conscious process being experimented with on humans or 
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same model only acting through the underlying 
mechanisms. The computational architecture yields insight 
into the mechanisms underlying consciousness. The human 
or animal experiments, together with the replicated 
experiment with the agent, serve to test both the functional 
model and the associated computational model of 
consciousness. Both the high-level functional model and 
the underlying computational model can then be brought 
more in line with the results of these experiments. After 
alterations to the agent suggested by the new version of the 
architecture are made, new psychological experiments can 
be designed and carried out to test the current version of 
the theory. The amalgamated cycle continues. 
Phenomenal Consciousness in Machines 
The question of the possibility of phenomenal 
consciousness in machines has been debated ad nauseum.  
Science fiction authors have weighted in on the subject 
with such characters as Arthur Clark’s Hal and Star Trek: 
The Next Generation’s Commander Data. For pointers to 
the vast literature, please see Blackmore’s introduction 
(2003). For thoughts on the subject from AI researchers 
and others, please see Holland’s edited volume (2003).  
One of the current authors (Franklin) is on record 
doubting phenomenal consciousness in the case of the 
working software agent IDA who is endowed with 
functional consciousness (Franklin, 2003). These doubts 
are based on the lack of convincing evidence to the 
contrary. Such evidence for other humans consists of 
verbal reports. In the case of animals, morphological 
homology in mammals, at least, offers such evidence 
(Baars, 2001). Further such evidence is offered by 
binocular rivalry experiments on monkeys (Koch, 2004). 
For AI systems there is simply no such evidence. 
Must we conclude that phenomenally conscious AI 
systems are simply not possible? By no means. Merker 
suggests that phenomenal conscious evolved in animals to 
provide the animal with a stable coherent virtual 
environment from which to deal effectively with its world 
(2005). Merker notes that any animal whose sensors move, 
as do human eyes, must be able to distinguish between 
actual motion of objects and agents in its environment and 
their apparent motion caused by the movement of the 
animal’s sensors. According to Merker, one way to solve 
this problem is by phenomenal consciousness which 
provides a stable, coherent world to the animal that’s 
independent of the motion of its sensors. He hypothesizes 
that this solution to the apparent motion problem 
constituted at least a part of the fitness advantage that led 
to the evolution of phenomenal consciousness.  
Franklin suggests that phenomenal consciousness may 
provide the same benefits to a cognitive robot, and that the 
process of producing such a stable, coherent virtual 
environment in the robot may also result in phenomenal 
consciousness in a machine (2005). Currently we only 
know how to produce phenomenal consciousness through 
biological reproduction. Its mechanisms are only 
speculated about (Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Dehaene, et 
al, 2003; Koch, 2004). An attempt to provide a robot with 
moving sensors with a stable, coherent account of its world 
may well lead us to explore mechanisms for ignoring 
apparent motion. These mechanisms, while filtering out 
apparent motion, may pass through a stable coherent 
virtual reality that would serve the robot as phenomenal 
consciousness serves humans. Exploring such mechanisms 
for filtering out apparent motion seems worth a try. 
Discussion 
We have demonstrated that there are clear benefits to 
incorporating consciousness in designing autonomous 
artificial agents. These include the use of consciousness to 
provide a filtering mechanism and a potential solution to 
the relevance problem. Without specifically mentioning 
consciousness, an earlier AI architecture, the blackboard 
architecture as used in Hearsay (Hayes-Roth and Lesser, 
1977), was noted by Baars (1988, p.79) as a forerunner of 
Global Workspace Theory and, hence, of functional 
consciousness. Knowledge sources in the blackboard 
architecture correspond to processors in GWT. The 
blackboard’s control shell plays the role of attention, the 
competition for consciousness in GWT. Writing to be 
blackboard corresponds to the global broadcast. What’s 
missing in the blackboard architecture is effectors capable 
of external as well as internal actions, and the essential role 
of consciousness in learning.  
Consciousness can also assist in implementing 
developmental learning mechanisms that are functionally 
similar to human-like learning. The learning framework 
that was briefly descried earlier marks a significant 
departure from current machine learning paradigms. No 
large training sets would be required. New knowledge 
would be easily integrated into old. Several tasks could be 
learned concurrently with transfer of knowledge to new 
tasks. 
It is important to acknowledge that not all artificial 
agents require consciousness to achieve their goals. In fact 
agents involved in relatively simple tasks in restricted 
domains can performs quite well with traditional AI 
techniques and without any functional consciousness.   
Expert systems which have been remarkably successful in 
solving a variety of real world problems serve as 
exemplars to this point. It is possible that a still more 
complex artificial autonomous agent with a task requiring 
more sophisticated decision making would require them. In 
our view consciousness is best reserved for artificial agents 
that aspire to be broad models of human cognition and 
solve real world problems in dynamic environments. It also 
appears that consciousness comes into its own in agent 
architectures where online learning of facts and/or skills is 
of prime importance.  
In addition to consciousness being of potential utility to 
AI, in our view experiments with autonomous artificial 
agents that incorporate aspects of human consciousness 
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consciousness. Experiments with conscious agents provide 
hypotheses that can potentially be verified by conducting 
experiments with humans. The advantage of hypotheses 
that stem from AI systems are that they can be specified at 
sufficient levels of details. 
In a similar vein Gamez (2007) suggests the neural 
correlates of consciousness could be better understood by 
AI systems that model consciousness with neural networks 
(e.g. Dehaene et al., 2003; Shanahan, 2006). There are 
other, more tangible, real world benefits as well. For 
example, insights gained from such models could also be 
used to improve the diagnostic capabilities of medical 
professionals with respect to patients that are comatose or 
suffering from related phenomena. 
We acknowledge that current techniques for studying 
conscious phenomena at a fine grained level, such as PET, 
fMRI, EEG, implanted electrodes, etc., are still lacking 
either in scope, in spatial resolution, or in temporal 
resolution. PET and fMRI have temporal resolution 
problems, EEG is well-known to have localizability 
difficulties, and implanted electrodes (in epileptic patients), 
while excellent in temporal and spatial resolution, can only 
sample a small number of neurons; that is they are limited 
in scope. As a result, many of such emerging hypotheses, 
while testable in principle, will be difficult to test at the 
present time. However, improved recording methods are 
emerging rapidly in cognitive neuroscience. It is important 
to note that when Global Workspace Theory (Baars 1988, 
1997) was first proposed, the core hypothesis of “global 
activation” or “global broadcasting” was not directly 
testable in human subjects. Since that time, however, with 
the advent of brain imaging, widespread brain activation 
due to conscious, but not unconscious, processes has been 
found in dozens of studies (see Baars, 2002; Dehaene, 
2001). We expect further improvements to make 
hypotheses provided by experiments with conscious AI 
systems testable as well. 
Conclusion 
In summary, we offer tentative conclusions to each of 
the questions posed in the introduction:  
Are there theoretical foundations for the study of 
consciousness in AI systems? Baars’ Global Workspace 
Theory (Baars, 1988; 1997) and our LIDA conceptual 
model that fleshes out GTW (Ramamurthy et al, 2006) 
provide just such a theoretical foundation. We argue this 
point elsewhere (Franklin et al, in press). 
Can cognitive architectures that include consciousness 
be of use to AI? We claim that the roles of functional 
consciousness in 1) filtering so as to allow only the most 
important information through, and in 2) solving the 
relevance problem by allowing the recruitment of 
appropriate internal resources, constitute major 
contributions to AI systems that include it. In addition to 
IDA (Franklin, Kelemen, and  McCauley. 1998; Franklin 
2003), both neural schema (McCauley, 2002) and 
Conscious Tutoring System (Dubois, Nkambou, and 
Hohmeyer. 2006) provide examples of such AI systems. 
Can such AI cognitive architectures add to our 
knowledge of consciousness in humans and animals? 
Software agents endowed with functional consciousness 
can be used to test mechanistic hypotheses derived from 
their underlying theory by replicating appropriate in vivo 
experiments. Knowledge about possible underlying 
cognitive mechanisms should provide guidance to 
cognitive neuroscientists researching consciousness. 
Are phenomenally conscious AI systems even possible? 
The idea of implementing a stable, coherent virtual world 
for a cognitive robot, gives some hope that phenomenally 
conscious cognitive robots might be designed and built.  
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